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Protecting the Environment with Salvage Law: Risks,
Rewards, and the 1989 Salvage Convention
Abstract Current marine salvage law often provides only limited incentives for salvors
to prevent pollution. In many cases, it also inadequately compensates them for the risks
they must assume when they assist a ship that threatens the environment. This Comment
analyzes possible solutions to these problems under current salvage law, and then dis-
cusses the reforms offered by the 1989 Convention on Salvage. It concludes that current
salvage law is inadequate to protect the public from the threat of pollution, and that the
Convention on Salvage, if adopted, could greatly improve incentives for marine salvors to
protect the environment.
The traditional laws regarding salvage of ships and property in dan-
ger of being lost at sea have served shipowners and salvors into the
twentieth century. With the recent, explosive growth of the oil and
chemical ocean trades, however, modem marine casualties often
endanger interests other than those of shipowners and salvors. Where
once cargo that washed ashore meant a windfall for a lucky beach-
comber, the flotsam from a tankship "besmirches everything with
which it comes into contact."1  Salvors may refuse to assist ships
threatening pollution because the risks2 assumed would be dispropor-
tionate to the compensation available under salvage law. Moreover,
salvors who assist a ship may have limited incentives to protect the
environment.
This Comment examines the compensation scheme for salvage
under the present law and the risks faced by salvors in environmental
cases.3 It then considers whether salvage contracts or the novel theory
of "liability salvage" can solve the problems that such cases present.
Finally, it examines the 1989 Convention on Salvage (the Convention),
which is intended to reduce financial risks and increase rewards for
salvors Who work to protect the environment.4 This Comment con-
cludes that without a change in the underlying law, standard salvage
contracts and liability salvage are unlikely to solve the problems of
environmental cases. The Convention, however, could provide a
1. Sheen, Conventions on Salvage, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1387, 1394 (1983).
2. "Risk," as used in this Comment, means the expected net cost of a course of action,
considering all possible costs and benefits weighted by their probability of occurring. Risk
includes both personal danger and financial risk.
3. Throughout this Comment, an "environmental case" is a marine casualty that significantly
threatens public safety or the environment. Generally, these cases include threats from bulk oil
and chemical cargoes and from ship's fuel.
4. This Comment focuses on the Convention's strategies for protecting the environment. For
a more general discussion of the Convention, see Gaskell, The International Salvage Convention
of 1989, 4 INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 268 (1989).
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workable system of salvage law that responds to both industry needs
and environmental values.
I. THE PROBLEMS OF SALVAGE LAW AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Traditionally, maritime casualties posed little threat to the environ-
ment. Salvage law accordingly developed to preserve only the
threatened ships and their cargo. Today, although pollution from
marine casualties often may destroy environmental resources, salvage
law continues to protect only ship and cargo owners. The Convention
would change salvage law to encourage salvors to protect both the
environment and maritime property.
A. The Current Law Regarding Salvage Rewards and the Protection
of Maritime Property
General maritime law5 has long encouraged mariners to assist ves-
sels and recover property from the perils of the sea.6 United States
courts have relied heavily on principles from the general maritime law
in developing U.S. admiralty rules.7 The laws of other maritime
nations, therefore, have greatly influenced the development of U.S. sal-
vage law.
8
To be eligible for a reward under traditional salvage law, salvors
must prove (1) that maritime property was endangered; (2) that the
salvor was under no duty to assist; and (3) that some of the property
was saved by the salvor's acts.9 This final element is the "no cure-no
pay" rule: regardless of the merits of the salvage effort, if no property
is recovered the salvor receives no compensation.10
5. The "general maritime law" applied by U.S. courts includes both concepts that U.S.
admiralty courts find in European authorities and rules improvised to fit the needs of the United
States. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 45-52 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter GILMORE & BLACK].
6. See D. STEEL & F. ROSE, KENNEDY'S LAW OF SALVAGE § 28 (5th ed. 1985) [hereinafter
KENNEDY'S].
7. Uniformity in maritime law facilitates international commerce. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571, 581-82 (1953).
8. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 533. However, the 1910 Brussels Salvage
Convention, which was intended to increase international uniformity in salvage law, has had
little effect on U.S. salvage law. Id. at 534.
9. Id. at 535.
10. Id. Anyone may salve abandoned property, but owners may refuse offers of salvage as
long as they remain in possession of the vessel. Id. at 535-36. Compensable acts of salvage can
range from heroic rescues at sea to merely carrying distress messages or providing navigational




In the United States, admiralty courts usually base the amount of
the salvage reward on the factors identified in The Blackwall 11 first,
the value of the property recovered and the degree of danger from
which it was rescued; second, the salvors' skill, energy, labor, and their
exposure to risk; and finally, the value of the property the salvors used
and the danger to which it was exposed." Those who benefit from the
salvor's efforts, usually the insurers of the ship and cargo owners, must
pay the salvage reward. 3
Determining the amount of reward under these guidelines is discre-
tionary and unscientific. 4 Nevertheless, two paramount considera-
tions affect the reward. First, rewards must encourage future
meritorious acts of salvage.15 Therefore, they must be large enough to
encourage salvors, yet not so large as to discourage shipowners from
seeking assistance. 6 Second, the amount awarded may not exceed the
salved value of the recovered property. 7 The salved value thus serves
both as an independent factor in the reward calculation and as a ceil-
ing to the amount awarded. 8
This scheme of determining salvage rewards encourages economic
efficiency in traditional salvage cases.1 9 Because the reward is based
11. 77 U.S. 1 (1869) (salvage of British cargo ship by steam tug). These factors are the "main
ingredients" that courts consider, not an exclusive list. Id. at 13-14.
12. Id. at 14; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 559. Professional salvors are entitled to
more liberal awards than incidental (non-professional) salvors because of their need for
specialized skills and equipment. See eg., B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 702 F.2d
333, 340 (2d Cir. 1983).
13. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 574. This Comment uses "owner" to encompass all
interested parties who may be required to pay the salvage reward, including shipowners, cargo
owners, and their underwriters. Underwriters are vital actors in the economics of salvage law.
Gold, Marine Salvage Law, Supertankers, and Oil Pollution:- New Pressures on Ancient Law, 11
REVUE DE DROIT (UNIVERSrIT DE SHERBROOKE) 127, 139 (1980).
14. "Eventually the trial judge will pull an arbitrary figure out of the air." GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 5, at 563.
15. 3A M. NORRIS, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY: THE LAW OF SALVAGE § 233 (7th ed.
1989). The court may award far more than restitution of the salvor's costs for a job well done.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 562; KENNEDY'S, supra note 6, §§ 19, 1113.
16. M. NORRIS, supra note 15, § 241.
17. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 563. These two considerations are intimately related:
to the extent that the award exceeds the market value of the salvor's work, it compensates for the
risk the salvor takes that an inadequate amount of property will be recovered. Landes & Posner,
Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study ofLaw and Altruism,
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 101 (1978) [hereinafter Landes & Posner].
18. The salved value typically includes the value of the ship, cargo, and freight after salvage.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 561.
19. Commentators have so argued. See Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 100-06; see also
Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of
Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REv. 879, 909-10 (1986). But cf Note, Calculating and
Allocating Salvage Liability, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1896 (1986) (arguing that the no cure-no pay
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on salved value, it encourages salvors to provide salvage resources
commensurate with the value of the threatened property.20 Further-
more, the salved value ceiling discourages salvors from assisting in
cases where the risk of salvage outweighs the value of the recovered
property.2"
B. Development of Professional and Contract Salvage
The recent growth in the marine transportation of bulk chemicals
and oil, along with other changes in maritime trade,22 have brought
parallel changes in salvage technology.23 Tankships carry millions of
gallons of oil and chemicals, and even passenger and freight vessels
carry large quantities of oil as fuel. Modem salvage often requires
expensive and specialized equipment, trained crews, large salvage ves-
sels, and the skills of experienced professional salvage masters. 24
Contracts for salvage developed with the rise of professional salvage
services. Today, most professional salvage claims arise under con-
tract. 25 Nevertheless, contract salvage has not completely supplanted
traditional salvage. Contracting may be impossible for an imperiled
vessel.26 If contracts are negotiated under the monopolistic conditions
of a marine casualty, courts may set them aside on grounds of
duress.27 Moreover, some parties involved in a salvage situation may
not be bound by a contract.2 8 When contracts fail, salvage law deter-
mines the reward. 9
rule is far from efficient). The applicability of these arguments to environmental cases is
discussed infra, notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
20. Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 104.
21. Id.
22. Sheen, supra note 1, at 1390. Changes in maritime trade over the last 150 years include
the development of power driven vessels, instantaneous worldwide communications, and the
expansion of corporations. Id.
23. The growth of shipping led to the establishment of professional salvage services at
strategic locations during the late nineteenth century. Because keeping skilled crews and
expensive equipment idle waiting for work is uneconomical, today few salvors can handle very
large salvage cases. Gold, supra note 13, at 139-40.
24. See Sheen, supra note 1, at 1387; Gaskell, supra note 4, at 268.
25. KENNEDY'S, supra note 6, § 692.
26. See Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 100.
27. The salvor may demand unfair terms from the vessel in return for urgently needed
assistance, or a vessel master may disguise the nature of the danger until after the salvor has
agreed to contract terms. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 579; Landes & Posner, supra note
17, at 101.
28. See, e.g., B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 702 F.2d 333, 341 (2d Cir. 1983) (U.S.
as cargo owner not bound by salvage contract due to sovereign immunity); GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 5, at 583 (crews on salving vessels may not be bound by arbitration agreements of
owners and masters).
29. See M. NORRIS, supra note 15, §§ 170-71 and cases cited therein.
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C. The Risks in Environmental Cases
Salving ships is inherently risky to salvor's lives, equipment, and
finances. In environmental cases, however, risks may be so great that
even the full value of recovered property is not enough to encourage
salvage.3" Environmental threats increase the salvor's risk in two
principal ways: first, they greatly increase the magnitude of potential
liabilities, and second, they increase the possibility that nations
threatened by pollution may take defensive measures that frustrate the
salvage effort and leave the salvor uncompensated.
L The Salvor's Liabilities in Environmental Cases
Under the traditional law of salvage, salvors are liable for gross or
willful negligence, and for simple negligence if the harm suffered dif-
fers from that which originally threatened the vessel.31 Several recent
cases characterize this standard as a "Good Samaritan" duty not to
worsen the vessel's position.32  Negligence often may be difficult to
prove, particularly in non-contract cases, because salvors vary greatly
in expertise and often act under exigent circumstances. 3 Under con-
tract, however, a negligent professional salvor may be liable to the
owner for breach of an implied warranty of reasonable skill and care.3 4
In assisting a vessel which threatens to pollute, a salvor's acts may
cause substantial damage, inviting negligence claims from shipowners
and injured parties.3" A salvor may need to pump part of the cargo
30. Because of the frailty of the machinery in modem ships, the cost of repair for a ship may
often exceed its repaired value. Thus, even for a successful salvor, the award may be limited by
the value of a vessel that has been declared a costructive total loss. Coulthard, A New Cure for
Salvors? A Comparative Analysis of the LOF 1980 and the CM.L Draft Salvage Convention, 14 J.
MAR. L. & CoM. 45, 47 (1983).
31. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 554-58. A salvor may thus be required to pay the
owner affirmative damages for independent harms such as negligent mooring of the vessel. See,
e.g., The Noah's Ark v. Bentley & Felton Corp., 292 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1961).
32. See eg., Berg v. Chevron, U.S.A., 759 F.2d 1425, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1985).
33. See, eg., KENNEDY'S, supra note 6, § 976; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 554.
Nevertheless, rewards may be decreased when the salvor shows a want of skill or competence.
See supra text accompanying note 12.
34. See, eg., The Tojo Maru, I All E.R1 1110, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 341 (1971) (diver employed by
contract salvors, while attempting to bolt a steel plate onto a tank that was not gas free, caused
explosion and extensive damage. The English House of Lords applied contract law to determine
liabilities); see also In re Alva S.S. Co., 616 F.2d 605, 610 (2d Cir. 1980) (salvor employed under
contract held liable for 78 percent of damages resulting from explosion of tanker caused by
salvor's negligent inerting procedures).
35. Dubais, The Liability of a Salvor Responsible for Oil Pollution Damage, 8 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 375, 377, 381 (1977); see, eg., In re Amoco Cadiz, 1984 A.M.C. 2123, 2189 (N.D. Ill.)
(contract salvor may be liable to third parties for gross and willful negligence).
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into the sea, or may cause pollution while towing a vessel.3 6 Pollution
may extensively damage both the marine environment and those
whose livelihoods depend on it. 37 Furthermore, explosions, fires, or
release of gases can threaten port facilities and human lives. 38  The
state, federal, and international laws controlling pollution liabilities 39
often leave the salvor unprotected from potential liability claims."
Thus, the salvors' liability risks in environmental cases are much
greater than in more traditional salvage operations.
2. Government Frustration of the Salvage Effort
International law vests national governments with jurisdiction to
take measures on the high seas to prevent grave and imminent dangers
of pollution to their coasts.4 Within the territorial sea and internal
waters, government intervention authority may be substantially
greater.4" When governments intervene in a marine casualty to pro-
tect their coasts, they may complicate the salvage operation or cause
complete loss of the property being salved. Government action has
ranged from excluding the vessel from coastal waters43 to intentionally
destroying the vessel.' The prospect of government intervention
increases both the salvor's anticipated costs and the risk that the
salved value will be insufficient to compensate those costs.
36. See Dubais, supra note 35, at 380-81.
37. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN THE SEA: INPUTS, FATES, AND
EFFECTS 3-16 (1985); Begley, Smothering the Waters, NEWSWEEK, April 10, 1989, at 54-57
(discussing damages from the Exxon Valdez spill).
38. See Alva S.S. Co., 616 F.2d at 607 (2d Cir. 1980).
39. See Wallace & Ratcliffe, Water Pollution Laws: Can They be Cleaned Up., 57 TUL. L.
REV. 1343, 1355-56 (1983).
40. Dubais, supra note 35, at 384.
41. This authority was recognized in the International Convention Relating to Intervention
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, (Intervention Convention) done November
29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. No. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068 (entered into force May 6, 1975).
42. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A § 1223(b) (West 1986) (if justified by safety, U.S. Secretary of
Transportation may order any vessel under U.S. jurisdiction to operate in any manner).
43. For example, several Caribbean governments denied salvors permission to bring the
tanker Atlantic Empress into their territorial waters where fighting the fire on board would have
been easier. Instead, the vessel headed into the Atlantic leaking oil, suffered several explosions
and was lost. Gold, supra note 13, at 143.
44. For example, after the Torrey Canyon grounded off the Coast of England in 1967, the
English government ordered naval bombardment so that the ship's cargo of oil would burn and
not pollute the coast. The salvors, who had been nearing success in their salvage effort,
recovered nothing. Sheen, supra note 1, at 1395-96.
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D. Efforts to Solve the Salvage Problems of Environmental Cases
L Contract Solutions
In recent years, salvors, owners, and underwriters have developed
contracts that encourage salvage of oil tankers. Three of these agree-
ments are particularly important. First, in 1972 owners and under-
writers agreed to include a standard clause in salvage agreements
indemnifying salvors for liabilities resulting from oil pollution.45 Sec-
ond, tanker owners and their underwriters developed a voluntary
scheme known as TOVALOP.46 TOVALOP requires shipowners to
pay the cost of certain reasonable private efforts to remove the threat
of pollution.47
Finally, Lloyd's4" revised its Open Form Salvage Agreement in
1980 (LOF 80) to encourage salvors to undertake salvage in environ-
mental cases.4 9 LOF 80 incorporates many customary salvage princi-
ples, including no cure-no pay.50 The 1980 revisions, however,
require salvors to use their "best endeavors" to prevent oil from escap-
ing from a vessel.5" They also provide a limited exception to the tradi-
tional no cure-no pay rule: if the salved vessel is a tanker laden with
oil, owners must pay the salvor's expenses plus up to fifteen percent,
even if the vessel and cargo are lost.5 2
Despite these developments, the salvage industry has declined in
recent years.53 Professional salvors have sought contract terms more
45. KENNEDY'S, supra note 6, §§ 895, 1464-65. The parties agreed to this provision after the
International Salvage Union (ISU) members refused to salve tankers without it. See id. § 1464;
E. VINCENZINI, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SALVAGE AT SEA 92 (1987). The ISU
represents the interests of professional marine salvors throughout the world; its members include
33 professional salvage companies. Annual Survey and Statistics, 6 INT'L SALVAGE UNION
BULL., September 1987, at 8.
46. Tanker Owner's Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution [hereinafter
TOVALOP], reprinted in KENNEDY'S, supra note 6, § 1945-55.
47. Id cl. IV.(a). About 99 percent of the world's oil tanker tonnage participates in
TOVALOP. KENNEDY'S, supra note 6, § 1427 at 579 n.73. Owners may be able to deny salvors
reimbursement for such costs under several exceptions to liability provided in TOVALOP. Id.
§§ 1427-30.
48. The Lloyd's association of underwriters is the recognized center of the marine
underwriting business. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 55.
49. See O'May, Lloyd's Fonn and the Montreal Convention, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1412-23 (1983).
LOF 80 is the most widely used standard contract. KENNEDY'S, supra note 6, § 1307.
50. Lloyd's Open Form Salvage Agreement (1980) reprinted in KENNEDY'S, supra note 6,
§§ 1451-63, [hereinafter LOF 80] cl. l(a). Parties determine the salvor's payment by negotiation
or arbitration after the service is complete. Id cls. 6-12.
51. Id. cl. l(a).
52. Id.
53. The number of salvage contracts, the percentage of salved value awarded to salvors under
those contracts, and return on investments in vessels, equipment, and crews are declining for ISU
members. Annual Survey and Statistics, 7 INT'L SALVAGE UNION BULL., September 1988, at 13.
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favorable than no cure-no pay, but they have been unable to obtain
better terms except in the limited circumstances to which the LOF 80
safety net applies. 4 Economic forces continue to reduce the number
of salvors capable of assisting in large-scale salvage efforts."5
2. Liability Salvage: A Possible Judicial Solution
"Liability salvage" is based on the concept that salvage rewards
should reflect the value of the owner's assets preserved from liability
claims, as well as the value of recovered property. 6 Advocates of lia-
bility salvage argue that prevented harms should be used both to raise
the reward ceiling and to determine the portion of the salved value
awarded to the salvor. 7
U.S. courts have rejected the liability salvage theory. In Westar
Marine Services v. Heerema Marine Contractors, a salvor prevented a
flotilla of barges and an oil derrick from damaging a bridge. 8 The
court held that in assessing the reward, it could consider the danger to
the flotilla but not the value of the damage to the bridge that the salvor
prevented. 9
Salvors' claims for liability salvage also were rejected in Allseas
Maritime, S.A. v. M/VMimosa, where salvors likely prevented severe
pollution of the Texas coast.' In Allseas, the Fifth Circuit noted that
even if the salvors had not acted, the Mimosa's owners would have
been able to limit their liability to the value of the salved property. 61
Therefore, the court held that the salvor's reward was limited to the
54. The ISU members have been unable to negotiate collectively with insurers because of
European Community competition laws and competition from "occasional" salvors who do not
maintain the expensive equipment that professional salvors require. Porter, Marine Salvage
Industry Faces a Crisis, Firm Warns, J. COM., Nov. 13, 1987, at 10.
55. "Greater hazards, problem owners, a shipping industry still in crisis and difficulties
surrounding arbitration" may be factors in the decline. The amount of work available for salvors
no longer justifies huge investments in salvage equipment. Reinigert, Salvors in a Modern War
Situation, 6 INT'L SALVAGE UNION BULL., Sept. 1987, at 5.
56. See, e.g., Sheen, supra note 1, at 1404; Westar Marine Services v. Heerema Marine
Contractors, 621 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
57. See, e.g., Westar, 621 F. Supp. at 1140.
58. Id. at 1136.
59. Id. at 1144.
60. 812 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1987). The Allseas case dramatically illustrates the kinds of harm
that can be prevented by a diligent salvor's timely assistance. The crew of the Mimosa
abandoned ship, leaving her afire and turning in ever-widening circles. With some extremely
dangerous maneuvering, the tug Taroze Vizier helped prevent the abandoned vessel from
damaging several oil rigs. Id. at 245. Without the salvor's help, the Mimosa might have caused
millions of dollars in damages. Id. at 247.




salved property value, refusing to consider the benefit to other parties
of the salvor's efforts.6 2
Even opponents of liability salvage acknowledge its conceptual
charm.63 The Allseas court acknowledged the attractiveness of the lia-
bility salvage theory in dictum," and at least one Lloyd's arbitrator
has found that public policy justifies a higher reward when a salvor's
efforts prevent oil pollution.6" Nevertheless, no United States court
has increased salvage rewards based on the liability salvage theory.
E. Incentives for Protection of the Marine Environment Under the
1989 Salvage Convention
In April, 1989, sixty-six nations and observers from nineteen non-
governmental international organizations met in a diplomatic confer-
ence to revise salvage law. 6 Using a draft convention prepared by the
Comit6 Maritime International,67 the conference adopted the Interna-
tional Convention on Salvage, 1989.68 The United States has not yet
62. Id. at 246.
63. As one opponent noted, "We are all in favor of saving liability, as we are all against sin."
O'May, supra note 49, at 1424.
64. "There is considerable merit... in the position that salvors should be compensated for
liability avoided. Whether the salvor protects a shipowner's vessel or his other assets, the
economic benefits are equally valuable." Allseas, 812 F.2d at 247. One commentator has argued
that this dictum may presage acceptance of liability salvage. Brown, AllseasMaritime S.A. v. The
Mimosa: Has the Keel Been Laid for Liability Salvage in the Fifth Circuit?, 19 J. MAR. L. & COM.
583 (1988). The Westar court also left open the possibility of adopting some form of liability
salvage in an appropriate fact situation. See Westar Marine Services v. Heerema Marine
Contractors, 621 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
65. Sheen, supra note 1, at 1406; see also Brice, The Enhanced Award and the Safety Net, 7
INT'L SALVAGE UNION BULL., September 1988, at 8.
66. Final Act of the International Conference on Salvage, 1989, done April 28, 1989,
reprinted in M. NoRRIs, supra note 15, App. B-41.
67. The Comit6 Maritime International (CMI), founded in 1896, is dedicated to developing
uniformity in international law. See Paulsen, An Historical Overview of the Development of
Uniformity in International Maritime Law, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1065, 1084 (1983). The CMI draft
convention is reprinted in KENNEDY'S, supra note 6, §§ 1536-60.
68. International Convention on Salvage, 1989, IMO Document LEG/CONF. 7/27, opened
for signature July 1, 1989, art. 28.1, reprinted in M. NORRIs, supra note 15, App. B-28
[hereinafter Convention]. The Convention does not apply to salvage of platforms and drilling
units on location. Individual nations may determine its applicability to government-owned
vessels, salvage in inland waters, incidents involving certain maritime cultural property such as
historical wrecks, and incidents where all interested parties are nationals. Id. arts. 3, 4, 30.
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ratified the Convention69 and the Convention has not entered into
force for other nations.7"
When a vessel threatens damage to the environment, 7 the Salvage
Convention would encourage salvors to protect the environment in
four ways. First, the Convention imposes on shipowner and salvor
reciprocal duties to exercise "due care"7" to minimize damage to the
environment.7 3 Although the Convention allows other provisions to
be varied by contract, 4 these reciprocal obligations are binding on
owner and salvor regardless of contract terms.7 5 Second, the Conven-
tion requires courts to consider the "skill and efforts of the salvors in
preventing or minimizing damage to the environment" when they
determine salvage rewards.7 6
Third, while the Convention retains the traditional salved value ceil-
ing for rewards, 7 it provides "special compensation" to salvors who
assist a vessel threatening environmental damage, even if neither the
vessel nor the cargo is saved. 7' Although both vessel and cargo own-
ers contribute to the basic reward, the vessel owner alone pays special
compensation. 9 Special compensation may be awarded only to the
69. The United States signed the Convention, subject to Senate ratification, on March 29,
1990. Interview with Frederick Rosa, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Coast Guard, on April 8,
1990 [hereinafter Interview] (LCDR Rosa was a principal advisor to the U.S. representative,
International Conference on Salvage, 1989. Notes on file with Washington Law Review).
70. The Convention will enter into force one year after 15 nations have accepted it.
Convention, supra note 68, art. 29.1.
71. "Damage to the environment means substantial physical damage to human health or to
marine life or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by pollution,
contamination, fire, explosion or similar major incidents." Id. art. l(d).
72. This standard differs from the LOF 80 requirement of "best endeavors," and simply
implies reasonableness. See Gaskell, supra note 4, at 278.
73. Convention, supra note 68, art. 8. These duties do not extend to third parties. The
Conference rejected a proposal to extend the duties of owner and salvor to third parties because
the Convention was fundamentally a private law instrument, and because of problems
encountered with international acceptance of other agreements on liability. Interview, supra note
69.
74. Convention, supra note 68, art. 6.1.
75. Id. art. 6.3.
76. Id. art. 13.1 (b). The salvor's liability risks, the state of readiness of the salvor's equipment
used in the operation, and the specialized nature of that equipment also are factors in the reward.
Id. art. 13.1(g)-(j).
77. Id. art. 13.3.
78. Id. art. 14. Special compensation includes reimbursement for salvor's expenses. Salvors
who successfully prevent damage to the environment are entitled to as much as an additional 30
percent of expenses, and up to twice their expenses in extraordinary cases. Id. art. 14.2.
"Expenses" include both out-of-pocket costs and a fair rate for equipment used. Id. art. 14.3.
79. Id. art. 14.1. The Conference rejected a U.S. recommendation to require shipowners
alone to pay the environmental enhancements to basic salvage rewards. Gaskell, supra note 4, at
281, 283. As a compromise, the conference acknowledged that a court need not award the entire
salved value to the salvor before it assesses special compensation from the owner. Final Act of
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extent it exceeds amounts otherwise recoverable under the basic
reward."0 If a salvor negligently fails to minimize damage to the envi-
ronment, both the basic reward and special compensation may be
reduced or eliminated."
Finally, the Convention acknowledges the need for nations to coop-
erate with vessel owners and salvors. While it does not oblige nations
to support salvage efforts, it requires them to "take into account the
need for cooperation" among the private parties and public authorities
involved in salvage operations to minimize damage to the
environment.
8 2
II. PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT WITH SALVAGE
LAW
Marine salvors are capable of preventing tremendous amounts of
environmental harm. Current salvage law, however, often discourages
salvors from working to prevent pollution. The Convention would
provide salvors and shipowners with appropriate incentives to protect
the environment and would internalize some of the costs of marine
pollution currently borne by the public.
A. Problems in Current Salvage Law
Traditional salvage law fails in two ways to meet the challenges
presented by modern environmental cases. First, the salved value ceil-
ing may discourage salvors from assisting where the environmental
threats are the greatest, because it prevents courts from compensating
salvors for their risks. Second, even when salvors assist, salvage law
encourages salvors to protect only the owner's interests, not the inter-
ests of others affected by pollution. Neither existing standard salvage
contracts nor liability salvage will significantly improve the incentive
structure of the current law by themselves. Both maritime industry
and the public interest require fundamental legislative change in the
law of salvage.
the International Conference on Salvage 1989, done April 28, 1989, Attachment 1, reprinted in
M. NORRIS, supra note 15, app. B-48.
80. Convention, supra note 68, art 14.4.
81. Id. art. 14.5.
82. While the government may still take control of salvage operations, the salvors involved in
such operations will be entitled to the rights provided under the Convention. Id. arts. 5.1-5.2.
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1. The Failure of Existing Law to Encourage Assistance in
Environmental Cases
In traditional salvage cases, the salved value ceiling usually suffices
to compensate salvors, because the value of the property is large com-
pared to the salvor's risk.83 In some environmental cases, however,
the reward ceiling may dissuade salvors from assisting endangered ves-
sels. Both the likelihood of government intervention and the prospect
of negligence liability increase with the pollution threat. Thus, where
timely acts of salvage can prevent the greatest harm from pollution,
salvors face the greatest risks of undercompensation and liability. In
these cases, salvage law falls short of its foremost purpose: it fails to
encourage salvage.
2. The Limited Success of Contract Solutions
Contract solutions to the problems of environmental cases have
achieved limited success. LOF 80 provides a "safety net" only for sal-
vors of laden oil tankers.84 Owners have been able to retain no cure-
no pay terms in other circumstances, such as those involving freight
and passenger vessels and chemical tankers.85
The decreasing demand for salvage services in recent years has
weakened the salvors' negotiating position.86 Inequalities in bargain-
ing power prevent salvors from obtaining more favorable contract
terms. Because salvage is occasional work and demands unique kinds
of equipment, salvors depend on owners for their profitability, while
the owners often may have a variety of salvors from which to choose.87
Owners have little reason to grant salvors more favorable contract
terms unless the supply of professional salvage services diminishes.88
As market forces continue to reduce the availability of salvage, how-
ever, shipowners will be less able to respond adequately to serious
environmental threats.
83. The ISU reports that from 1978 to 1987, the salvage rewards and settlements from its
members averaged six percent of salved value. Annual Survey and Statistics, 7 INT'L SALVAGE
UNION BULL., Sept. 1988, at 10.
84. LOF 80, supra note 50, cl. l(a); see supra text accompanying note 52.
85. Porter, Marine Salvaging Industry Faces a Crisis, Firm Warns, J. COM., Nov. 13, 1987, at
10.
86. See supra note 53.
87. The reward factors virtually guarantee that the owner's benefits will greatly exceed the
cost of salvage. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
88. The supply might be reduced either by collective action of the salvage industry or by its




3. The Liability Salvage Alternative
Liability salvage, in theory, could raise the reward ceiling by
allowing the court to include in the ceiling assets that owners other-
wise would have lost through liability claims. Because protecting
these assets is as valuable to the owner as protecting property at sea,
economic efficiency rationales support the liability salvage theory.8 9
In practice, however, liability salvage would present immense
problems of proof. Under the traditional law, a court readily can
determine the value of recovered property. 90 In contrast, estimating
the damages that the owner would have paid would be highly specula-
tive.91 Such speculation would greatly complicate judicial proceedings
and arbitration, and would inject controversy in cases that might
otherwise be settled by negotiation.
These problems of proof need not prohibit claims for liability sal-
vage in all cases. Where it is clear that the value of prevented liabili-
ties far exceeds the salvor's costs and the owner has assets from which
to satisfy the judgment, a court should be able to provide the salvor
with at least restitution of costs. The fundamental need to encourage
salvage justifies compensation based on liability salvage in such cases.
Nevertheless, U.S. courts have been disinclined to consider liability
salvage claims. Even if the courts recognized liability salvage, because
of the narrow circumstances where it could be used, salvors' incentives
might be unaffected. 92
4. The Inefficiency of Salvage Law
The benefits from salvor's actions in an environmental case may be
categorized as follows: (1) "property" benefits, or preservation of the
owner's property directly at risk; (2) "liability" benefits, or preserva-
tion of the owner's assets that would have been lost through penalties,
litigation costs, successful claims, and similar costs; and (3) "public"
benefits, or prevention of harms for which the owner would not have
89. See supra text accompanying notes 17 and 64.
90. The recovered vessel and cargo are tangible proof of the benefit conferred by the salvor.
A court bases the salvage rewards on such results because of difficulties monitoring the quantity
and quality of the salvor's efforts. See Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 104.
91. O'May, supra note 49, at 1424. A court would need evidence concerning the harm that
would have been caused without the salvor's intervention, whether suit would have been brought
for those damages, and whether the plaintiffs would have recovered in the face of defenses or
counterclaims. Westar Marine Services v. Heerema Marine Contractors, 621 F. Supp. 1135,
1145 n.39 (N.D. Cal. 1985); O'May, supra note 49, at 1424.
92. Salvors would only be encouraged to assist in those cases where they were nearly certain
they could prove that they saved the owner from significant damage claims. In other cases, the
risks would still outweigh rewards.
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paid, including environmental damage. The public benefits from
efforts to prevent pollution may be substantial, because liability laws
and the costs of litigation often make it impracticable for many of
those injured by pollution to recover damages from the polluter.93
A critical defect in current salvage law is its failure to reward sal-
vors adequately for liability and public benefits. Salvors often can pre-
vent vast amounts of pollution harm with comparatively little effort.
An economically efficient law would encourage salvors to act when-
ever the expected benefits of acting exceeded the cost of the salvor's
efforts. Yet traditional salvage law rewards only property benefits, 94
disregarding liability benefits except as they demonstrate the salvor's
skill,95 and ignoring public benefits completely.96 In short, salvage law
does not encourage salvor's to act efficiently.
Furthermore, current law does not encourage salvors to make serv-
ices available at the optimal level. Because many of the costs of pollu-
tion are borne by the public, the shipping industry's demand for
salvage services does not reflect the full value of salvors' ability to pre-
vent pollution. Market forces will stabilize the size of the salvage
industry at a level that reflects only owners' demands, and not the true
utility of salvage services. 97 The public therefore will bear the costs of
pollution that owners and an adequate salvage industry could have
prevented.
Owners should pay for reasonable efforts to prevent pollution. Con-
temporary environmental laws often require industries to meet strin-
gent pollution prevention standards, because private law remedies
cannot internalize the costs of pollution after it occurs. 98 For the same
reason, the law should require owners to pay for reasonable efforts to
93. Even if polluters are subject to strict liability, private law remedies are inadequate to
internalize the costs of pollution. Proving causation for harms may be impossible (such as where
environmental pollutants cause cancer), economic and aesthetic harms may not be recoverable
under the law, and harms that are substantial in the aggregate may be too minor individually to
generate claims. See, e.g., Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L.
REV. 19, 32-33 (1986).
94. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
95. Allseas Maritime, S.A. v. M/V Mimosa, 812 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1987); see supra notes 12,
56-65 and accompanying text.
96. Liability salvage would reward salvors for liability benefits, but would do little to
encourage public benefits. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
97. Landes and Posner's discussion of salvage law's economic efficiency is thus incomplete to
the extent that it ignores the external costs of marine pollution. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.




prevent pollution during salvage operations, rather than allowing
them to pass the costs of pollution on to the public.99
5. The Need for International Legislative Action
Existing law does not provide effective solutions to the problems
presented by environmental cases, both because of practical limita-
tions and because of its failure to encourage salvors to prevent public
harm. An environmentally responsible salvage law would
(1) encourage investors to provide salvage resources at the optimal
level; (2) encourage salvors to assist vessels whenever their action can
reduce harm; (3) encourage salvors assisting a vessel to minimize harm
to others; and (4) encourage owners to seek assistance when needed.
The failure of salvage law to protect owners, the public, and the envi-
ronment from the dangers of modem maritime casualties mandates
comprehensive worldwide reform in the laws governing salvage.
B. Protecting the Marine Environment under the 1989 Convention
on Salvage
The Convention would encourage environmentally responsible sal-
vage in two ways. First, it would allow courts to increase salvage
rewards for reasonable efforts to protect the environment. Second, it
would transfer much of the risk that salvors currently must assume in
environmental cases to vessel owners. Using these strategies, the Con-
vention would make professional salvors and maritime industry more
responsive to environmental concerns.
1. Encouraging Environmental Protection
Where a vessel threatens "damage to the environment," the Con-
vention encourages salvors to provide many of the environmental ben-
efits ignored under current salvage law. It requires both owners and
salvors to use "due care" to protect the environment and allows courts
to consider salvors' environmental efforts in determining salvage
rewards."° By focusing on salvors' efforts rather than on the harms
prevented, the Convention avoids the uncertainty problems of liability
salvage; courts need not speculate about the extent of harm prevented
or about the owner's liability.101
99. Sheen notes that under traditional salvage law concepts, if the salved vessel owner would
not have been liable for the prevented harms, the innocent third party, who otherwise would
have borne the damage, should pay the salvor. See Sheen, supra note 1, at 1407-08.
100. Convention, supra note 68, arts. 8, 13.1(e); see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying
text.
101. Convention, supra note 68, art. 13.1(b); see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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The Convention's effectiveness in protecting the environment will
largely depend on how courts construe its definition of "damage to the
environment."1' 2 Although this definition is ambiguous, 10 3 the envi-
ronmental concerns that inspired the Convention require that it be
interpreted to reach all situations where the salvors' environmental
efforts may have substantial value.
The Convention does not specify remedies for breach of the environ-
mental obligations that it establishes in salvage contracts. 1" Such
remedies, however, may be inferred from the Convention's purposes.
Where the contract provides for the arbitration of the reward, a sal-
vor's breach will most likely result in reduced compensation or affirm-
ative damages. In other cases, devising an appropriate remedy may be
problematic. Nevertheless, the public policy underlying the Conven-
tion demands a remedy even if neither salvor nor owner can prove
harm from the breach. 105
2. Transferring Risks to the Owner
The Convention's "safety net" provision for special compensation
transfers the salvor's risk of undercompensation to the owner. Where
the risk of undercompensation under current law might dissuade a sal-
vor from assisting, the Convention assures a salvor of at least restitu-
tion of expenses. Moreover, a salvor can receive a substantial profit if
the efforts to prevent pollution are effective. Thus the Convention
encourages salvors to assist even where recovery of the property is
uncertain.
The Convention would not significantly reduce the probability of
government intervention in an environmental case. Because salvors
are guaranteed expenses, however, much of the risk of government
102. The environmental incentives of the basic reward and the special compensation
provisions apply only where a possibility of "damage to the environment" exists. Convention,
supra note 68, arts. 8, 13.1(b), 14; see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
103. Gaskell suggests that a threat of "damage to the environment" exists only in
circumstances similar to those which would justify government intervention under the
Intervention Convention (supra note 41). Gaskell, supra note 4, at 277. This interpretation is
doubtful. The conventions deal with vastly different subjects; while the Intervention Convention
dealt with an extraordinary right (control and possible destruction of a foreign flag vessel on the
high seas), the Salvage Convention is meant to control standard commercial relationships and
contracts. Moreover, the two conventions differ substantially from each other in relevant
language. LCDR Rosa stated that in his view, the delegates at the Salvage Conference did not
intend to restrict application of the environmental incentives as Gaskell suggests. Instead, they
only intended to bar recovery where the pollution harms would have been minor or
inconsequential. Interview, supra note 69.




action would be transferred to the shipowner. The Convention also
provides the salvor with a basis in law for requesting entry to territo-
rial waters. '06 Although governments retain the authority to exclude
and to intervene in salvage cases, their duty to cooperate under the
Convention could provide a small counterweight to the political forces
which might otherwise generate a "not in my backyard" response to a
request for help.
The Convention neither expands nor reduces the prospect of liabil-
ity for the salvor, because it neither defines the salvor's duties to third
parties nor limits the salvor's liabilities. Instead, it allows courts to
consider the salvor's liability risks in calculating the reward.1 1 7 The
Convention thus continues to protect the environment from negligent
salvors as it increases protection from vessel casualties.
3. The Convention's Effect on Professional Salvage and the Shipping
Industry
The Convention could affect the shipping and salvage industries in
several ways. First, because the Convention requires owners to
assume new risks and to pay for salvors' efforts to protect the environ-
ment, salvage may become more costly for owners.10 8 A rise in the
price of salvage could result in a shift of owners' resources to improv-
ing safety and thus preventing maritime casualties from occurring.10 9
Second, owners may become more willing to agree to contract terms
favorable to the salvors simply because non-contract salvage becomes
less of a bargain. Third, since salvage compensation under the new
Convention will better reflect the actual social value of salvage efforts,
the supply of available professional salvage services should stabilize
closer to its socially desirable level.
Finally, the Convention could possibly make owners more reluctant
to call for assistance. Even under current law, the costs of salvage
may make owners slow to request salvage. 1 0 Under the Convention,
owners will continue to hire salvors as long as the property and liabil-
ity benefits of salvage are substantially greater than the cost, but if
106. Convention, supra note 68, art. 11; see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
107. Convention, supra note 68, art. 13.1(g); see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
108. Under the Convention, owners would benefit from increased vessel salvage and pollution
prevention capabilities and correspondingly reduced insurance costs, offsetting any rise in the
cost of salvage.
109. One of the effects of a rise in the cost of rescue is an increase in expenditures to prevent
the need for rescue. See Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 91-92.
110. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Hesitation may have contributed to the




they perceive the benefits to be marginal, the tendency to hesitate
might increase. Such delay could turn a minor casualty into a
disaster.
A full solution to the problems of inadequate response by owners
requires reforms that are beyond the scope of salvage law. For exam-
ple, some of the liability schemes currently under consideration can
help to internalize the costs of pollution within the marine transporta-
tion industry."1  Better liability laws can offset any tendency to hesi-
tate caused by increases in the owner's cost of salvage. When liability
laws and market forces are insufficient to compel prompt response to
pollution threats, governments will intervene to protect their waters,
and may also assess civil and criminal penalties for inadequate private
response.
Nevertheless, where salvors can effectively reduce harm from pollu-
tion, the Convention will encourage them to do so. Moreover, it will
reduce the salvor's risk in these cases and will make the shipping
industry responsible for the costs of pollution prevention. Thus the
Convention effectively addresses the most urgent problems of salvage
in environmental cases.
III. CONCLUSION
The destructive potential of bulk oil and chemicals in maritime
commerce requires substantial reform in the ancient laws of salvage.
Under current law, salvors in environmental cases face heightened
risks and have little incentive to protect the public from pollution.
Contracts for salvage have achieved only limited success in dealing
with the problems of environmental cases, and courts are unlikely to
develop satisfactory judicial solutions. Thus, international legislative
action to reform salvage law is imperative.
The 1989 Salvage Convention would encourage salvage that is both
economically efficient and environmentally responsible. By ratifying
the Convention, the United States can improve private sector response
to marine casualties which threaten the environment and can help
transfer the costs of pollution to those who benefit most directly from
the marine transportation of oil and chemicals.
Brian F. Binney*
111. See, e.g., Wallace & Rateliffe, supra note 39, at 1355-67.
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